Mineral supply concentration and risk

Which risk index this is: the x-axis is the same risk-weighted concentration index used throughout this widget, run under a single fixed lens — the WGI governance headline (2024) — not the unmodified/unweighted supply-concentration (HHI-style) lens the main widget also offers, and not wired to the widget's other 46 lenses (environmental, human-development, natural-hazard, etc.); this overview stays on one lens deliberately, so every resource's position is comparable on the same terms. What's real and what isn't otherwise: both axes are grounded in primary sources, across all 78 resources this widget tracks. Two of the 78 (Coking coal, Sulfur) have no 2024 production row in the underlying data, so their x-axis position uses each one's own most recent available year instead — noted in their tooltip. One more, Hafnium, uses real British Geological Survey data but for a different element (Zirconium minerals, its geological travelling companion) reused as a disclosed proxy — see the Resource picker's own note on it for why. The global figure and every domestically-adjusted figure are computed live from this widget's own production-share and governance data (2024 for almost everything), not from a separate precomputed table. The "Other country" picker uses the same math for any economy that produces a meaningful share (≥0.5%) of at least one tracked resource — genuinely useful for somewhere like Indonesia or Brazil that carries real exposure but has no published list of its own to check against, which is exactly the gap it's there to fill; a country that barely produces anything on this list will just look like the global view, which is itself an honest answer. The y-axis recognition flags have been checked, one by one, against the nine governments' own published critical/strategic-minerals lists (US: USGS/DOI final list, Federal Register, Nov 2025; EU: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252, Annexes I–II; UK: BGS OR/24/047, Nov 2024; Australia: DISR Critical Minerals List + Strategic Materials List, Dec 2023; New Zealand: MBIE, Jan 2025; Japan: METI, most recently revised June 2025; South Korea: MOTIE, Dec 2023; Canada: NRCan, June 2024; India: Ministry of Mines master list, June 2023), researched September 2026. Two naming quirks worth flagging rather than hiding: this widget's "Bauxite" is the ore, and most countries' lists instead name the metal ("Aluminium"/"Aluminum") — only the EU's list explicitly names bauxite/alumina/aluminium as one combined entry, which is why Bauxite shows just one tick even though several of these economies clearly care about the aluminium supply chain. And New Zealand's list, checked directly against its January 2025 final version, genuinely does not include lithium or tantalum — an odd omission for an advanced economy, but that's what the primary document says. One modelling limitation: because most of these economies currently score similarly on the governance measure used here, the leftward shift you see when picking a country is driven almost entirely by how much of that resource it produces itself, not by which low-risk partners it happens to import from — that would need real bilateral trade data, which this widget does not carry. The UK and Australia lists were extracted from the primary PDFs by an automated pass rather than a manual line-by-line read — treat those two as good-but-not-final until spot-checked. On China specifically: unlike the other nine, China has no fully public, official critical-minerals list. An unreleased ~36-item catalogue (grown from 24 in 2016) reportedly sits inside China's confidential 2021–2025 mineral resources plan and circulates only in policy-adjacent literature; it's also built on a different logic than the other lists — a material qualifies by economic/defence importance, supply vulnerability, or China's own market dominance over processing, whereas the other nine are essentially all import-dependency risk. So the y-axis simply has no China data point to plot, honestly, rather than a fabricated "not recognised" flag — the huge leftward shifts you'll see for gallium, germanium, tungsten and rare earths reflect only how completely China already dominates their production.